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Abstract
We discuss the notion of ownership in economics, taking our point of departure in the
Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach. We criticize the exclusive identification of
ownership with residual rights to control in this approach, and argue that economic
organization may be rendered determinate under complete contracting (contrary to the GHM
approach). Crucially, we argue that under complete contracting, some control rights may be
appropriable because of measurement and enforcement costs.  This holds the key to a theory
of ownership that is not dependent on the notion of residual rights to control, but rather
relies on appropriable control rights.  However, the two perspectives may be complementary
rather than rival.
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Introduction
What is the meaning of ownership in economics and why does it matter for economic
organization?  These issue were brought to economists’ attention by Ronald Coase’s (1960)
pioneering paper, and gave rise to what was once called “the property rights approach” (e.g.,
Alchian 1965; Demsetz 1967; Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Barzel 1082, 1987, 1994, 1997).
However, modern (formal) economists increasingly tend to think of ownership and its
implication from a different perspective, namely from that of the Grossman-Hart-Moore
approach (henceforth, the “GHM approach”) (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore
1990; Hart 1991, 1995).  Sometimes this hugely successful approach is also called “the
property rights approach”, but it is not identical to its non-formal predecessor.
Strong claims are made in the GHM approach about the category of ownership.   More
specifically, ownership is defined as residual control rights to assets, that is, the right to
determine the uses of assets under circumstances that are not specified in a contract.
Because it is assumed that ownership is perfectly enforceable by courts (while contracts are
not), ownership over assets provides “status quo points” (or “threat points”) for the parties’
bargaining over the surplus from contracting, which influence their investment incentives.
In contrast, ownership cannot be associated with the notion of rights to residual income, as
in the older property rights literature.
In this paper we shall discuss the GHM approach from a critical perspective informed by the
“older” property rights economics.  The novel contribution of the paper is to contest a
number of basic claims made about ownership in the GHM approach and to suggest an
alternative. 1  This does not mean that we think that of the notion of ownership as control
rights as nonsensical.   Rather, the point is that much of the literature has not gone
sufficiently far in thinking about control.  In particular, it has neglected a particular category
of control rights, namely what we call “appropriable control rights”. As a general matter,
this concept refers to reallocation of rights by means of appropriation by one or more of the
parties to a contract.  Thus, shirking (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) is one example of an
agent appropriating control rights, but the concept has a much broader coverage.  Generally,
appropriation of control rights will take place when there are costs of detecting
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 In his review of Hart (1995), Demsetz (1998) also criticizes Hart’s use of the concept  of ownership.  Though
related, his perspective is, however, different from ours.
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appropriation, of taking precautionary measures against appropriation, and of verifying that
appropriation has taken place to a third party.  Appropriable control rights directly influence
behavior because they determine the residual income from the use of assets.  This is in
contrast to the residual rights of control, stressed in the GHM approach, where the link
between residual rights of control and residual income is only indirectly established through
the effect on bargaining power.
Furthermore, in contrast to residual rights of control, appropriable control rights exist under
complete (or comprehensive) contracting. For example, under complete contracting, there
may be variability that necessitates measurement activities.  The presence of measurement
costs means that some control rights will effectively be appropriable. Economizing with
measurement costs may be sufficient to render ownership − in the sense of concentration of
appropriable control rights − determinate.  For example, dissipation may be minimized if
appropriable control rights are concentrated in the hands of one agent, along with residual
rights to income.  Per implication economic organization may be determinate even under
complete contracting.   However, the aim is not to reject the GHM approach; the two
concepts of control rights are not substitutes, but rather complements.  Thus, the notion of
appropriable control rights may be combined with the GHM emphasis on residual rights of
control.  This helps remedying some deficiencies in the GHM approach, such as its inability
to account for, for example, quasi-vertical integration, rental contracts, and the employment
relation.
We begin by presenting the GHM approach in broad outline (“The GHM Approach to
Ownership and Economic Organization”), and then turn to a broad critical discussion of the
approach.   Our basic critique is that there is a fundamental asymmetry in the GHM
approach: Whereas residual rights of control are fully enforceable in courts, contracts are
not (“Legal Ownership, Economic Rights, and the Asymmetry in the GHM Approach”).
This asymmetry arise because property rights are not properly considered as multi-
dimensional, which limites the explanatory potential of the GHM approach.  We argue that
considering appropriable control right eliminates this asymmetry by stressing the inability to
fully enforce all property rights and thereby making explicit the many ways in which
residual income arises.  Moreover, we point out that this notion of ownership is consistent
with complete contracting and that economic organization (e.g., the firm-market choice)
may therefore be rendered determinate under complete contracting (“Ownership and
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Complete Contracts”). Finally, we examine the implication for the GHM approach of
incorporating appropriable control rights, and point out that this makes it possible to derive
conclusions that run counter to those of this approach (“Implications for the Grossman-
Hart-Moore Approach”).
The Grossman-Hart-Moore Approach to Ownership
Following the pioneering paper by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1986), “The Costs
and Benefits of Ownership”, the GHM approach has become virtually dominant in the
modern economics of organization. In addition to the issues traditionally considered in the
theory of the firm − such as the boundaries of the firm − the GHM approach has been
applied to, for example, corporate finance (Hart 1995), corporate governance, the
organization of production in public versus private firms, and the boundaries of knowledge-
intensive firms (Brynjolfsson 1994).  Moreover, the approach is continuously being refined
(notably Rabin 1993; Farrell and Gibbons 1995; Noeldeke and Schmidt 1995; Hart and
Moore 1998; Rajan and Zingales 1998), and extended, for example, combined with ideas
from principal-agent theory (Holmström and Milgrom 1991, 1994).
The GHM approach makes a number of strong claims about ownership and its implications
for economic organization.  We briefly review these here.
First, it is argued that ownership should be associated with the notion of residual rights to
control rather than with the notion of residual rights to income (as in, e.g., Jensen and
Meckling 1976).  In support of this, the noted American legal scholar and judge, Oliver
Wendell Holmes is quoted (in Hart 1995: 30n):
But what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the same as those
incident to possession. Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is
allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered with,
and is more or less protected in excluding other people from such interference.
The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no one.
In effect, the concept of ownership in the GHM framework is made virtually identical to
that of lawyers, although no compelling explicit reason is given for why economists should
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necessarily adopt the juristic conception of ownership.2 The implicit reason arguably is that
only this conception of ownership will allow one to discriminate between alternative types
of economic organization, such as integration or non-integration.
Second, granting that ownership means residual rights to control, this notion per definition
only makes sense under incomplete contracting, since residual rights of control are defined
as the rights to determine the uses of assets under circumstances that are not covered by
contractual terms.3  Strictly speaking, ownership doesn’t exist under complete contracting
according to the GHM approach.  Complete contracting obtains when contracts are such that
“... the list of conditions on which the actions are based is exhaustive, that is, ... the contract
provides explicitly for all possible conditions” (Shavell 1998: 436).4
Third, under complete contracting, economic organization is indeterminate, exactly as
economic organization is indeterminate under Arrow-Debreu contracting (i.e., full
contingent claims contracting with no asymmetric information). Per implication,
perspectives that work out of a complete contracting set-up, such as principal-agent theory
or measurement cost theory, cannot explain, for example, the boundaries of the firm and are
in general lacking of a convincing theory of ownership.
Given these basic assumptions, the GHM approach may now be summarized thus.
Historically and conceptually, the GHM approach has been developed in the context of the
theory of the firm, more precisely the analysis of the vertical boundaries of the firm
(Grossman and Hart 1986).  Applied to firms, the approach begins from the idea that
ownership of non-human assets is what defines firms.  Thus if two different assets are
owned by one person, we are dealing with one firm, whereas if the same two assets were
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  Hart (1995: 30) refers to ”common sense” as justification.
3
 Incomplete contracting obtains if performance of the original terms of agreement leaves gains from trade
unrealized given the information available to the parties to the contract at the time performance takes place
(Masten 1998).  Incomplete contracting implies that some actions and payments will have to be determined
ex post. The difference between complete and incomplete contracting also has to do with the role of the
court.  In complete contracting theories, courts are assumed to enforce the original agreement, and ordering
is efficacious, even if all information may not be available to the court.  This is in contrast to the incomplete
contracting approach where the incompleteness of contracts introduces opportunities for recontracting and
where court enforcement of the original terms would leave gains from trade unrealized given the information
available to courts at the time performance takes place.
4
 However, although all contingencies can be specified, the court may not be able to verify some contingencies
or outcomes.  The parties may therefore not be able to condition performance on every relevant contingency.
However, under complete contracting, all payments and actions can be specified ex ante.
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owned by different persons, we would be dealing with two different firms.  The assets that
are relevant here are non-human assets, since human assets are non-alienable.   The
importance of non-human assets derives from their (potential) function as bargaining levers
in situations that are not covered by contract.  This may be crucially important in situations
where the parties have invested in specific assets − notably, investments in the parties’ own
human capital − and these assets are complementary to specific non-human assets.
Crucially, the parties’ investments in human assets are assumed to be non-contractible.
All bargaining that follows after the parties have made their investments in human assets is
assumed to be efficient (in contrast to, e.g., Williamson 1996). Therefore, the model
revolves around the effect of ownership of non-human assets on the incentives to invest in
human assets. Specifically, bargaining determines the allocation of returns from
investments, so that each party gets his opportunity cost plus a share (they are assumed to
share 50: 50) of the (verifiable) profit stream. Since in this set-up individual returns will
differ from social returns, and agents are sufficiently farsighted to foresee this, investments
will be inefficient. It is possible to influence the investment of one of the parties positively
by reallocating ownership rights to non-human assets. A reallocation of ownership of
physical assets alters the parties’ opportunity costs of non-cooperation (the status quo point)
after the specific investment have been made, and thus the expected payoffs from the
investment.  However, this comes only at the cost of reducing one of the parties’ investment
incentives (excepting the situation in which the parties’ marginal costs of investment are
equal).  This trade-off determines the efficient boundaries of the firm.  Thus, the central
issue is why it matters who owns an asset or a bundle of assets.
Critiques of the Grossman-Hart-Moore Approach
The reasons for the success of the GHM approach are not hard to discern: It is taken to be a
rigorous approach that successfully addresses many of the weaknesses of alternative (but
related) approaches, such as the transaction cost economics approach of Oliver Williamson
(1996).  However, the approach has not gone entirely without criticism.  In this section, we
first very briefly state existing critique, and then turn to our own critical points.
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Existing Critiques
In the GHM approach it is routinely assumed that agents can perform dynamic
programming, even though they are taken to be boundedly rational.  This has been subjected
to criticism on the grounds of lack of plausibility (Kreps 1996).  From a different
perspective, the approach has been criticized for its supposed lack of rigor when it comes to
the notion of contractual incompleteness, something which is postulated rather than derived
within the model (Maskin and Tirole 1997).  Moreover, it has been argued that the GHM
approach tends to exaggerate the need to rely on allocating property rights when clever
sharing rules can often do the same job (Tirole 1998).  It has also been pointed out that the
approach probably overestimates the extent to which specific assets are protected through
the allocation of property rights, since relational contracting can often accomplish the same
(Holmström and Roberts 1998).  Finally, objections have been raised about the importance
of residual rights in determining ownership.  As pointed out by Demsetz (1998), the value of
ownership derives from the value of all rights in an asset − and not just the residual rights
emphasized in the GMH approach.
Our Critical Points
Our critical points are different from the ones above.   In contrast to most of the above
critics we are explicitly inspired by “older” property rights economics of Coase (1960),
Alchian (1965), Demsetz (1967), Cheung (1983), Jensen, Meckling (Jensen and Meckling
1976) and Barzel (1994, 1997).  In this largely non-formal tradition, ownership and property
rights are more multi-dimensional than in the GHM approach.   Specifically, the notion of
property rights refers to a vector of rights, such as use rights, the rights to derive income
from assets, and the rights to alienate the assets − and not just residual rights to control.5
Applied to the GHM approach, this insight means, in our view, that the link between
residual rights of control and residual income rights is much more blurred than portrayed in
the GHM approach. This is because recognizing the multi-dimensionality of property rights
reveals a fundamental asymmetry in GHM approach.  Specifically, ownership in the sense
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 However, even the latter notion is somewhat broader than it may seem at first sights, for in the GHM
approach, residual rights to control are taken to encompass not only the rights to use assets, but also to “...
decide when or even whether to sell the asset” (Hart 1995: 65).
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of residual rights to exercise control is taken to be fully enforceable in court, while contracts
are taken to be non-enforceable because of non-verifiable contract clauses.  However, when
one recognizes the multi-dimensionality of property rights, ownership may be no more of a
protection against appropriation than contractual arrangements. For example, rental
arrangements and employment contracts will give rise to agency costs, which stem partly
from the loss of the agent appropriating control rights.  These losses are incurred even in
complete contract world, as principal-agent theory demonstrates (i.e., the difference
between first-best and second-best outcomes).  In fact, it is hard to understand rental
agreements, quasi-integration and the employment contract at all, if one does not consider
appropriable control rights.
The conclusion that we draw from these critiques of the GHM approach is that the
allocation of appropriable control rights matters for, for example, the outcomes of the uses
that are made of assets.  This is sufficient to render ownership of such assets determinate.
In other words, ownership (in the sense of an allocation of control rights) is determinate in a
complete contracting world.   In the following sections, we shall elaborate these critiques of
the GHM approach and the more constructive lessons that we draw from these critiques.
Residual Rights to Control and Rights to Residual Income
In the writings of the “old” property right theorists ownership typically means possessing
the rights to residual income rather than residual rights to control (e.g., Alchian and
Demsetz 1972).  The reason for the strong emphasis on rights to residual income is, of
course, that it is the allocation of these rights that directly influence behavior, not residual
rights of control per se.   However, control rights and rights to residual income are clearly
related.  For example, in Alchian and Demsetz’ analysis rights to residual income are
allocated to the monitor of the productive team to ensure that he confronts incentives to
supply an efficient level of monitoring effort.
Hart (1989, 1995: 63-66) is explicitly critical of the notion of ownership as rights to residual
income, which, he claims, is “... not a very robust or interesting theoretical concept” (1995:
64).  Among the reasons given for this is that residual income rights are divisible which
residual control rights are not “in the same way” (p.64n).
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However, both in principle and in practice these rights are indeed divisible and transactable.
For example, one may imagine joint ownership of a taxicab, where one chauffeur drives it
on Monday to Wednesday, and the other one drives it from Wednesday to Sunday both
having full rights to the use of the asset within certain pre-negotiated contractual
restrictions. Timesharing of condominiums is another quite prevalent phenomenon.  Indeed,
Hart implicitly admits that residual rights of control are divisible when he talks about
“forms of intermediate ownership” (p.61), and refers to delegation in this context (citing
Aghion and Tirole 1997).  However, Hart also includes in the notion of residual rights to
control the right to veto the use of assets and to alienate the asset.  A problem is that this
does not necessarily make the distinction between who holds ownership and who does not
more precise, since even this right may be not be exercised unanimously (as with joint
ownership of assets in marriages).6
Moreover, inspection of the structure of GHM models reveals that residual rights to income
are crucial also in these models, and that there is a close connection between these rights
and control rights, exactly as there is in, for example, Alchian and Demsetz (1972).  Recall
from the summary made in the previous section that in GHM models what drives
investment incentives is in fact expectations about the division of the surplus, that is, the
rights to income that the parties establish through bargaining (see Barzel (1994) on this).
The importance of residual rights of control with respect to influencing behavior only
becomes apparent through the way in which they influence the “status quo point” and
thereby the bargaining power of the parties.  However, the influence of ownership over
physical assets depends on the options for uses of assets provided by formal ownership.
This in turn depends on the opportunity costs of alternative uses of the available assets7 and
on the enforcement of ownership rigths (which arbitrarily is assumed to be perfect).
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 In response to this argument, Hart (1995) probably would point out that joint ownership of assets is always
suboptimal if investments is in human capital. This is because a division of control rights to assets must
always leave the parties with strictly complementary bundles of control rights so that a human capital
investment cannot increase the productivity of a bundle of rights without access to the complementary
bundle. However, it cannot be assumed a priori that all divisions of rights create complementarities of this
kind.  It is, after all, an empirical question as to what extent it is possible to divide control rights into non-
complementary bundles.
7
 However, there are certain problems of defining all relevant opportunity costs in an incomplete contract
world.  Contractual incompleteness may be due to high costs of specifying and verifying certain uses of
assets, the lack of ability to foresee all possible uses of assets, or the lack of ability to foresee all future
contingencies. In the two latter cases, the opportunity cost of non-corporation may be ill-defined, simply
because future contingencies may change what are the best alternative uses of assets and these contingencies
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In sum, the implication of the reasoning in this section is that it is doubtful how much is
added by focusing exclusively on residual rights to control.  This is because, first, this
concept is also inadequate with respect to providing a clear cut definition of who holds
ownership (such rights are also divisible), and second, in reality, what is just as important in
these models as control rights are residual rights to income.  Finally, in the following
sections, we shall argue that residual rights to income are not just influenced by residual
rights of control but also by appropriable control rights.
Legal Ownership, Economic Rights and the Asymmetry in the Grossman-
Hart-Moore Approach
As mentioned earlier, the GHM approach is certainly not the only tradition within the
broader context of property rights theory. Important modern contributions to a different
stream of property rights theory, which is more in line with the Coase-Alchian-Demsetz
tradition, have been made by Yoram Barzel (1982, 1994, 1997). In order to understand
better the notion of appropriable control rights, it is instructive to contrast his notion of
property rights and ownership with Hart’s notion.  Barzel strongly emphasizes the
difference between legal formal title to assets on the one hand and economic rights to assets
on the other hand.   For example, he (Barzel 1994: 394; emphasis in original) goes as far as
defining economic rights over an asset
... as an individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly
consume the services of the asset, or to consume it indirectly through exhange.
A key word is ability: The definition is concerned not with what people are
legally entitled to do but with what they believe they can do.
In this view, the thief literally speaking holds property rights to the car he has just stolen.  It
is a view of property rights that is completely divorced from legal considerations.
In contrast, the distinction between legal formal title to assets and economic rights to assets
is not explicitly made in the GHM approach.8  Control rights, which are equated with
                                                                                                                                                                                 
may not be foreseen. Thus, opportunity costs may change as new opportunities or contingencies become
apparent and change the bargaining power of the parties and the value to the parties of ownership over
assets.  However, this is not part of the GMH approach.
8
 A consequence of not adequately making a distinction between holding legal title to assets and economic
ownership is that it becomes difficult to account for the creation of property rights in the context of the GHM
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ownership rights, are supposed to be completely backed-up by the legal system, including
the courts.  In our terminology, these rights are non-appropriable or “secure”.  Ironically, for
an approach that has made so much out of its symmetrical treatment of the costs and
benefits of ownership (Hart 1991: 139), this is a clear asymmetry, since some property
rights are assumed - arbitrarily - to be fully enforceable, while others are not.   What is the
source of this asymmetry?
Arguably, one source can be found in the use made of bounded rationality  and/or
asymmetric information in GHM models.  In a bounded rationality interpretation of the
GHM approach (Hart 1990), all prices and uses of assets are supposed to be known to
agents.  However, although agents are assumed to be able to fully anticipate (perhaps
probabilistically) the payoffs from their relations, they cannot anticipate some future states.
Thus, contracts are left incomplete.  This may alternatively be interpreted in terms of
asymmetric information.  Thus, all states are in fact anticipated, but for some reason, agents
are unable to specify their plans or the nature of these states in ways so that a court can
ascertain whether a certain plan/state materialized or not (Hart 1995). Either way it boils to
an assertion that some rights are unenforceable in court while others are not.
However, no basic reason is given for why ownership rights are fully enforceable in court
whereas some contractually stipulated rights are not.  Lawson (1994: 139; emphasis in
original) notes that ”[l]awyers … are likely to be more sensitive than philosophers to the
real-world problems of proof that often accompany legal claims of ownership”. (Apparently,
we may place economists in the same category as philosophers with respect to this issue).
In fact, the bounded rationality/asymmetric information of courts is likely to be an
impediment to a certain outcome of court litigation over ownership claims as well as over
contracts.
                                                                                                                                                                                 
approach (but see Rajan and Zingales (1998) for a recent attempt).   To put it in the terms of Barzel (1997),
in the GHM approach there is only one clearly identified “public domain” in which capture attempts may
take place, namely with respect to capturing others’ investments in their own human capital.   However, in
actuality there are many other public domains in which capture attempts may take place, but in the GHM
approach these are defined away by the assumption of symmetric information.  Of course, this is related to
the well-known critique that the GHM approach arbitrarily assumes that certain investments are contractible
and enforceable in court, while others aren’t.
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Ownership, Appropriable Control Rights  and Complete Contracts
Appropriable Control Rights
It is a crucial idea in the GHM approach that ownership cannot be understood under a
complete contracting regime.  Thus, Hart (1995: 5) argues that
[i]f contracting costs are zero, we can sign a rental agreement that is as effective
as a change in ownership.  In particular, the rental contract can specify exactly
what I can do with the machine, when I can have access to it, what happens if
the machine breaks down, what rights you have to use the machine, and so on.
Given this, however, it is unclear why changes in asset ownership ever need take
place.9
The flip-side of this reasoning is that in order to find a room for ownership, it is necessary to
make a break with the assumption of complete contracting, although the assumption of
symmetric information may be (and is) introduced for an analytical convenience.
However, to make ownership indeterminate it is required not only to assume that
contracting costs are zero, but also that there is symmetric information.  In other words, we
only agree with the quotation above if Arrow-Debreu contracting obtains.  Our point is that
even if complete contracting obtains, and the contract may ”… specify exactly what I can do
with the machine”, there may still be costs of measuring my wear and tear of that machine.
This means that, in effect, there will be control rights that while they can in fact be written
into a contract may not be enforceable, because of measurement costs. 10 These are
appropriable control rights. This distinction between control rights that can be enforced and
those that cannot (and which are therefore appropriable) because of measurement costs is
essential to our reasoning in the following.
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 It is somewhat inconsistent that Hart talks about a rental agreement, which presumes the existence of an
owner, and then talk about signing a rental agreement in the context of zero contracting cost, that is, when
according to his own logic, there shouldn’t be any owners (or at least, ownership is indeterminate) (thanks to
Jerome Davis for directing our attention to this).
10
 This may sound as if we have implicitly moved to an incomplete contracting setting.  However, this is not
the case.  Contracts are incomplete if parties are unable to specify their plans ex ante to the time action take
place; otherwise, they are complete.
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Note that in contrast to the GHM approach, we provide a reason why some rights are
appropriable while others are not.11  Also note that our notion of appropriable control rights
is not identical to the notion of residual rights of control in the GHM approach. Whereas the
GHM approach stresses that residual rights of control arise from high costs of drafting
contracts, we emphasize that appropriation of control rights will take place whenever there
are costs of detecting appropriation, of taking precautionary measures against appropriation,
and of verifying that appropriation has taken place to a third party.  These costs may exist
even under complete contracting, and so may appropriable control rights. Minimizing losses
due to the appropriation of control rights may render ownership determinate, as we argue
next.
Complete Contracting, Asset Ownership, and Appropriable Control Rights
We argue that when there are appropriable control rights, this may explain asset ownership.
The use of a durable asset requires not only that it paid its marginal product but also that it is
paid for use-induced depreciation. Assume that it is harder to detect the depreciation of the
asset after it has been used than when it is being used (e.g., a rental car).12  Thus, the costs of
measuring the wear and tear differ in the two situations.  Also suppose that it is less costly to
carelessly use than to carefully use an asset.
Consider three different arrangements. In the first arrangement the residual claimant and the
user are two different persons and the residual claimant  monitors use himself.   The optimal
amount of monitoring performed by the residual claimant depends on his marginal
opportunity costs of monitoring and the marginal benefit of monitoring.  Assuming that the
residual claimant has high opportunity costs of monitoring, the result will be an extensive
monitoring with an imperfect specification of the depreciation of the asset and therefore also
an imperfect pricing of the cost of carelessness in the handling of the asset.  The user of the
asset will be charged a premium that covers the residual claimant’s opportunity cost of
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 Furthermore, note that this also differs from principal-agent theory, where asymmetric information (of
effort, the realization of some stochastic variable, etc.) is basically assumed/asserted, no economic reason
being given for the asymmetry in question.
12
  This may not always hold true, but we believe it holds true with sufficient regularity to be interesting.   We
shall also assume that any user of an asset understands the causal connections between his actions and the
rate of depreciation of the asset (at least broadly).
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monitoring plus an additional premium, namely one that covers the expected losses from the
imperfect pricing of the depreciation of the asset.
The second arrangement is one where the residual claimant hires a monitor.  Assuming
competitive conditions, the residual claimant will do this if the residual claimant’s
opportunity costs in monitoring exceeds those of the monitor plus the costs that the residual
claimant has to incur in order to ensure that the monitor is monitoring efficiently (e.g.,
setting up an incentive payment). When these conditions are realized this arrangement
results in a  more intensive monitoring and a more precise pricing of the depreciation. This
reduce the premium the user have to pay for expected excessive depreciation which in turn
induces more uses with low costs of careful handling of the asset to participate in the
arrangement.
The third arrangement is to grant the user the ownership in the sense of concentrating
control rights in the hands of the residual claimant – a situation that in the case of complete
contracts is not acknowledged by Hart (1995).  This arrangement will result in the optimal
rate of depreciation since the user having the lowest costs of measurement will come closest
to setting marginal costs of carefulness equal to marginal benefits. From the perspective of a
(careful) user of the asset, owning the asset instead means that he does not have to pay the
premium to cover the higher measurement costs and expected greater depreciation (Alchian
and Demsetz 1972).
Under certain conditions, the value of the asset is maximized by ownership rather than by
arrangements where the residual claimant put the asset up for rent. What are these
conditions? Important conditions have to do with whether the asset can only be used in a
team-like manner and the scale of the asset.  Thus, efficient use may require that the asset be
used by a team.  Because of the nature of team production, control rights will be divided
among the members of the team (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).  In the presence of
measurement costs, this may preclude any of the holders of the rights to maximize their
residual, even though all control rights can be contractually specified.  Given this,
enforceable control rights implicitly specify the limits to which each team member can
contribute to the depreciation of the asset.
In this situation, it will pay to allocate appropriable control rights to those team members
who have the lowest opportunity costs of exercising care in the use of the asset since this
14
will reduce the optimal monitoring costs.  In turn, these opportunity costs can be influenced
by the specification of rights to residual income from the team’s activities and from the use
of the asset.  Since the careful user is more responsive to such incentives than the careless
user, joint production will be maximized by this allocation.   Therefore, it may pay to
concentrate both the rights to residual income from the asset and the appropriable control
rights over the asset in the hands of a limited subset of the team’s members, possibly in the
hands of only one team member.
This explains why ownership may be efficient relative to rental agreements with residual
claimancy.   Note that we have explained ownership here using Alchian and Demsetz’
insights in team production.  However, where they use team production to rationalize the
existence of a monitor/residual claimant, we have used team production to rationalize asset
ownership.
Scale considerations also matter.  Thus, for reasons related to the case of team use of an
asset. Operating large-scale assets efficiently normally (if not necessarily always) requires
that several people have access to it, and this creates the same problems of measuring the
depreciation of the asset, and the same solutions of concentrating control rights and residual
income rights.  From the point of view of a user, the advantage of small-scale assets, like the
key to a lock or a telephone, is that they normally can be used effectively by only a single
user.  In this case, it is usually efficient to concentrate ownership in the hands of the single
user right away, although even for such assets one may imagine various rental agreements,
where control rights and possibly also residual income rights are divided (e.g., telephones in
developing countries).
Clearly, these explanations of ownership have nothing to do with the hold-up situation that
is so central in the GHM approach.  In fact, the very set-up that we have briefly discussed
cannot be treated within the GHM approach.  This is because a holder of control rights can
costlessly have his rights enforced by courts, even if he had signed an incomplete rental
contract, leaving the use of the asset in the hand of somebody else.  Of course, this is related
to the asymmetry in the GHM approach that we discussed earlier, namely that while
ownership is fully enforceable, some contractual terms are not.
Our conclusion is that patterns of ownership may well reflect economizing on the costs of
measuring certain (levels of) attributes of assets (Barzel 1997), given variability and private
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information. Crucially, the pattern of ownership can be rendered determinate even under
complete contracting, supposing that there are costs of measuring the use of assets.
Related Approaches
Holmström and Milgrom (1991, 1994) and Holmström and Roberts (1998) arrive at
somewhat related conclusions in their multitask agency models.13 It is an implication of the
GHM approach that w hether a person is employed by a firm or interact with the firm
through market contracting turns on how much his non-contractible investments influence
joint surplus. Non-human assets are also central in this story because the degree of
complementarity between human and non-human assets influence joint surplus and because
the holder of control rights to such assets has a strong bargaining lever that gives him
authority over employees. Therefore, the degree of asset specificity should influence the
extent to which firms employ or contract out.
Holmström and Milgrom (1991, 1994) and Holmström and Roberts (1998) discuss the issue
of why some firms have their own sales force while other firms contract with independent
agents. Empirically, asset specificity does not appear to be determinative of the choice
between having an employed salesforce or independent agents, while measurement costs
and agency concerns do (Anderson 1985). This is contrary to the GHM story, if not to a
multitask agency/measurement cost story.
If agents work on multiple tasks, some of these tasks may be very costly to measure (e.g.,
preserving good relations to customers); however, performing them is vital to the firm.  If
employees are only rewarded in terms of how well they carry out measurable activities
(outputs), they will shift all their effort toward these activities. Hence, firms that confront
essential, but hard-to-measure, activities, will provide low-powered incentives and have
their own employed sales force.  Giving low-powered incentives to outside agents will not
do, since this will only mean that they will shift their effort towards the products of other
firms. In other words, measurement costs and agency concerns help explaining the
                                                          
13
 However, these models differ from our reasoning by not including the monitor’s opportunity costs and by
making assumptions about the risk-preferences of agents that we are not making. Moreover, the emphasis in
their models is on ownership as rights to residual income.  Finally, they do not consider as many margins as
we do.  Thus, in their models measurements costs are prohibitive so that it does not pay, for example, to hire
a monitor or become self-employed as monitor.
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boundaries of the firm, irrespective of considerations of assets specificity, and at variance
with the GHM approach.
The reasoning in the previous sections suggests why one may be at least uncomfortable with
this position.  While it is true as a matter of definition that residual rights to control do not
exist under complete contracting, the concept of ownership is not necessarily completely
covered by the category of residual control rights.  Rights to residual income are arguably
just as important or perhaps more important for making sense of ownership, and these rights
can certainly be defined under a complete contracting regime.
Implications for the Grossman-Hart-Moore Framework
Although we have criticized the GHM notion of ownership, we believe that ownership and
economic organization may be determinate even in an complete contracting setting and that
the notion of ownership as concentration of appropriable control rights have implications for
the GHM approach.  Thus, this paper should not be read as a call for abandoning the GHM
approach, but perhaps for making it more realistic with respect to its analysis of the
allocation of different types of rights. This may make the GHM approach better able to
handle certain real-world phenomena that it cannot adequately explain at its present state of
development.  We consider these first, and then turn to a broader discussion of the relations
between residual and specific control rights on the one hand, and appropriable and non-
appropriable control rights on the other hand.
Anomalies for the GHM Approach
Consider the case of so-called “quasi-vertical integration”, that is, the ownership
arrangement (which has been extensively used in the US automobile industry) of having a
firm owning a significant number of the complementary alienable assets of its supplier.   On
one level, this is completely consistent with the GHM approach: The ownership
arrangement reflects an attempt to protect against hold-up on the part of the supplier.  On
another level, however, quasi-vertical integration is puzzling in the context of the GHM
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approach, since it is hard to rationalize why the firm that owns the complementary alienable
assets hasn’t also employed the persons working in the other firm14.
More generally, it is hard to rationalize the employment contract at all within the GHM
approach.  In a discussion of this, Hart (1995: 71) refers to the idea that a benefit of the
employment contract is that carrying out activities within a firm means that information may
be exchanged more readily.  The reason, according to Hart, is that the employer’s control
over assets gives him bargaining power over the employee, which implies that the employee
may have an incentive to establish himself as reliable (thus possibly increasing his future
wage).  But this argument may be countered by asking, Why can’t quasi-vertical integration
accomplish the same?  The possession of ownership rights to the complementary alienable
assets of another firm could do exactly the same with respect to information revelation.  The
GHM approach may explain authority, but it does not explain the employment contract.
The decision whether to employ or to use quasi-vertical integration, which cannot be
addressed within the GHM approach, may be understood by adding appropriable control
rights to the GHM framework.  Specifically, if the exercise of appropriable decision rights
crucially influence payoffs from the use of assets, the employment contract may be superior
to quasi-vertical integration, whereas the opposite holds true when the exercise of
appropriable control rights are not critical to payoffs.  There are two reasons for this.
First, the courts treat employees and independent contractors differently; notably,
employees have to meet obligations that independent contractors do not.  This means that
although the employment contract is incomplete, there are rather definite limits to what
employees can do with respect to their exercise of appropriable rights.  Second, the
employment contract confers to the employer the right to monitor and sanction the
employee in ways that cannot be applied to an independent contractor.  These characteristics
mean that the employer is in a superior position to monitor and sanction the employee’s
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 The argument would probably run as follows: There is a number of other assets in the supplier firm which is
specific to investments in human capital of the owner of that firm and for the use of  which he needs
employees. Transferring the employees to the owner of the specific assets is not efficiency enhancing since
their marginal productivity is lower in that firm than in the supplier firm.
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exercise of appropriable decision rights. Thus, the employment contract will be chosen
when the exercise of these rights is important to payoffs.15
The Relations between Dimensions of Rights
In this paper we have discussed two conceptually different classifications of rights, namely
the distinction between residual and specific rights on the one hand, and the distinction
between appropriable and non-appropriable control rights on the other hand. However, as
already suggested, these two classifications are not mutually exclusive, but are rather
complementary. Table I juxtaposes the two classifications, and maps alternative theories
according to which concepts of rights they (primarily) rely on.
TABLE I
Categorizi ng theories in terms of rights
Appropriable rights Non-Appropriable rights
Residual rights Theories of regulatory
capture, rent-seeking,
lobbyism, etc. Also legal
theories.
The GHM approach
Specific rights Measurement cost and
agency theory
Arrow-Debreu contracting
So far we have primarily been taken up with discussing the “specific rights-appropriable
rights” box and the “residual rights-non-appropriable rights” box.  One of the remaining
boxes, namely “specific rights-non-appropriable rights”, is one treated in Arrow-Debreu
contracting. However, the final remaining box, namely “residual rights-appropriable rights”,
has been given less attention.  In our view, theories of, for example, regulatory capture and
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 This can be interpreted in agency theory frame (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994) as a reduction in the error
in the signals of effort which agents produce in different tasks due to more effective monitoring in
employment relationships.
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other examples of interaction between the political and administrative process and economic
agents belong here.  This is because these theories directly address the change of property
rights, for example, through influence activities.  Moreover, legal theories about ownership,
that is, theories that specify “… the actions and/or conditions necessary to establish an
ownership claim” (Lawson 1994: 140), evidently also belong here.
One should also consider the interaction between the boxes, and we have taken some steps
towards this (cf. also Milgrom and Roberts 1991, 1994).  Specifically, we have argued that
progress may be made by combining a focus on appropriable, specific rights with a focus on
non-appropriable, residual rights.   However, future research should also consider more fully
appropriable, residual rights in the context of economic organization.   For the moment, we
rest content with illustrating by means of an informal example that it makes a difference to
the GHM approach whether our concept of appropriable control rights is included.
Specifically, we want to argue that it may produce implications that run counter to those that
are produced by the GHM approach (without explicit consideration of appropriable control
rights).
Combining Residual Rights of Control and Appropriable Control Rights:
An Example
Consider two agents, A and B, who want to establish an employer-employee relation.  There
is one physical asset, X, involved in the relation.  The asset cannot be used if A and B does
not both work with it. It is assumed that only A can undertake investments in human capital.
Thus, there are two possible arrangements, 1) A owns X and employs B, or 2) B employs A,
and owns X. According to the GHM approach, 1) will be chosen, since this implies a lower
loss because of hold-up than 2).
However, this conclusion may change if we introduce the possibility of shirking, that is, the
capture of appropriable control rights. The specific form of shirking we here examine relates
to how an agent operates the physical asset with which he works.  He can operate it
carefully or less carefully.  It is costly to measure how much care a given agent takes in
handling the asset.   However, there are two types of activities that any agent can engage in.
The first of these operates the asset in a routine way.  Routine tasks are not costly to
monitor, since a small sampling of the agent’s effort or output is very informative about his
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overall performance with respect to taking care in handling the asset.  However, in the case
of complex tasks, it is very costly to measure how much care the agent takes in handling the
asset.
If B undertakes routine tasks, the GHM conclusion is reached: A should own the physical
asset in the GHM sense of possessing residual rights of control to it.  It is not very costly to
measure how much wear and tear he has imposed on the asset, and these costs cannot
overwhelm the loss from the possible hold-up.  This changes if instead B is assumed to
undertake a complex task.
From the perspective of agent A, the return on his investment in human capital depends on
the joint surplus from the relation.  The size of the surplus is influenced by the care that B
takes in handling the physical asset.   If B works in a complex way with the asset, it is very
costly for A to measure the wear and tear that B imposes on the asset.
However, in this situation, it may pay to give B residual rights to control to the asset –
although it is still only A who can undertake investments in human capital.  This is because
giving B the ownership to the asset improves his incentives to treat it in a careful way, and
thus eliminates the need for monitoring.   The resources saved on reduced monitoring may
swamp the loss from B now being able to hold up A.16
Conclusions
The GHM approach has emerged as a dominant approach to the study of the economics of
organization. This position has motivated the present discussion. Although we admire the
approach, we also feel that it may have been oversold by its advocates and that it is not as
unambigious and clear cut as at least more informal discussions suggest (e.g., Hart 1995).
Moreover, the ”new” property rights economics, that is, the GHM approach, is not an
unambigious scientific advance over the ”older” property rights approach of Coase, Alchian,
Demsetz et al.
Specifically, we have argued that proponents of the GHM approach have been too hasty in
identifying residual rights to control with ownership/the possession of property rights.
These are multi-dimensional concepts (Paul, Miller and Paul 1994).  Thus, we have argued
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 However, whether this will in fact be the efficient arrangement depends on the tasks that A undertakes.
Specifically, it requires that A works with the asset in a routinized way.
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that a strict identification of ownership with legally (completely) enforceable residual rights
to control is unnecessarily restrictive.  More importantly, thinking of ownership in this way
obscures that other possible meanings that make economic sense.  Thus, we have argued
that it is essential to distinguish between secure and appropriable control rights.  Control
rights may be appropriable even under complete contracting, and even under complete
contracting efficiency may dictate that such rights are concentrated, possibly along with
rights to residual income.
However, we have suggested that our emphasis on appropriable control rights may actually
be aligned with the GHM emphasis on residual rights of control.  This helps remedying
some deficiencies in the GHM approach, such as its inability to account for, for example,
quasi-vertical integration, rental agreements, and the employment relation.
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